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Abstract
Trust is a fundamental concern in large-scale open distributed systems. It lies at the core of all
interactions between the entities that have to operate in such uncertain and constantly changing
environments. Given this complexity, these components, and the ensuing system, are increasingly
being conceptualised, designed, and built using agent-based techniques and, to this end, this paper
examines the speciﬁc role of trust in multi-agent systems. In particular, we survey the state of the
art and provide an account of the main directions along which research eﬀorts are being focused.
In so doing, we critically evaluate the relative strengths and weaknesses of the main models that
have been proposed and show how, fundamentally, they all seek to minimise the uncertainty in
interactions. Finally, we outline the areas that require further research in order to develop a
comprehensive treatment of trust in complex computational settings.
1 Introduction
Many computer applications are open distributed systems in which the (very many) constituent
components are spread throughout a network, in a decentralised control regime, and which are
subject to constant change throughout the system’s lifetime. Examples include peer-to-peer
computing (Oram, 2001), the semantic Web (Berners-Lee et al., 2001), Web services (McIlraith
et al., 2001), e-business (Deitel et al., 2001), m-commerce (Vulkan, 1999; Sadeh, 2002), autonomic
computing (Kephart & Chess, 2003), the grid (Foster & Kesselman, 1998), and pervasive
computing environments (Schmeck et al., 2002). In all of these cases, however, there is a need
to have autonomous components that act and interact in ﬂexible ways in order to achieve
their design objectives in uncertain and dynamic environments (Simon, 1996). Given this, agent
based computing has been advocated as the natural computation model for such systems
(Jennings, 2001).
More speciﬁcally, open distributed systems can be modelled as open multi-agent systems that are
composed of autonomous agents that interact with one another using particular mechanisms and
protocols. In this respect, interactions form the core of multi-agent systems. Thus, perhaps not
surprisingly, the agent research community has developed a number of models of interactions
including coordination (Jennings, 1993; Durfee, 1999), collaboration (Cohen & Levesque, 1990;
Pynadath & Tambe, 2002), and negotiation (Rosenschein & Zlotkin, 1994; Jennings et al. 2001;
Kraus, 2001). However, their application in large-scale open distributed systems presents a number
of new challenges. First, the agents are likely to represent diﬀerent stakeholders that each have their
own aims and objectives. This means the most plausible design strategy for an agent is to maximise
its individual utility (von Neuman & Morgenstern 1944). Second, given that the system is open,
agents can join and leave at any given time. This means that an agent could change its identity onre-entering and hence avoid punishment for any past wrong doing. For example, an agent could sell
low-quality products, leave the system as soon as it gets paid (so avoiding retribution from buyers
or authorities operating in the system), and then subsequently rejoin the system unscathed. Third,
an open distributed system allows agents with diﬀerent characteristics (e.g. policies, abilities, roles)
to enter the system and interact with one another. Given this, agents are likely to be faced with a
number of possible interaction partners with varying properties. For example, several agents might
oﬀer the same type of Web service, but with diﬀerent eﬃciencies (e.g. speed of execution) or degrees
of eﬀectiveness (e.g. providing richer forms of output). Fourth, an open distributed system allows
agents to trade products or services (e.g. through various forms of auctions or market mechanisms),
and collaborate (e.g. by forming coalitions or virtual organisations) in very many ways. Therefore,
agent designers are faced with a choice of a number of potential interaction protocols that could
help them achieve their design objectives. Moreover, the choice about which interaction protocol
(or mechanism) to adopt is important since each protocol may enforce a diﬀerent set of rules of
encounter and each protocol may result in a diﬀerent outcomes for the agents involved (e.g. the
eBay auction allows the last highest bidder to win, while the Vickrey auction allocates the goods to
the agent with the highest valuation).
Speciﬁcally, we can characterise the key interaction problems in such contexts through the
following questions:
1. How do agent-based system designers decide how to engineer protocols (or mechanisms) for
multi-agent encounters?
2. How do agents decide who to interact with?
3. How do agents decide when to interact with each other?
In devising a protocol, it is intended that the sequence of moves of the agents and the allocation
of resources, brought about by applying the protocol, are made in such a way that they prevent
agents from manipulating each other (e.g. through lies or collusion) so as to satisfy their selﬁsh
interests. Therefore, having such protocols in place provides guarantees that should facilitate the
choice of interaction partners at any given time. However, protocols may, at times, be subject
to tradeoﬀs, among the rules they enforce, in trying to achieve their objectives (Sandholm, 1999;
Dash et al. 2003) (e.g. in voting, while some constraints force truth-telling, they may lead to
intractability). In such cases, it is left to the agents to decide how, when, and with whom to interact
without any guarantees that the interaction will actually achieve the desired beneﬁts. To make such
decisions would require agents to be fully informed about their opponents, the environment, and
the issues at stake. Such information should enable agents to devise probabilities for particular
events happening and, hence, allow them to act in a way that maximises their expected utility
(Savage, 1954). Moreover, given such information, agents should be able to act strategically by
calculating their best response given their opponents’ possible moves during the course of the
interaction (Binmore, 1992).
However, both the system (enforcing the protocol) and the agents may have limited computa-
tional and storage capabilities that restrict their control over interactions. Moreover, the limited
bandwidth and speed of communication channels limit the agents’ sensing capabilities in real-world
applications. Thus in practical contexts it is usually impossible to reach a state of
perfect information about the environment and the interaction partners’ properties, possible
strategies, and interests (Axelrod, 1984; Binmore, 1992; Russell & Norvig, 1995). Agents are
therefore necessarily faced with signiﬁcant degrees of uncertainty in making decisions (i.e. it can be
hard or impossible to devise probabilities for events happening). In such circumstances, agents have
to trust each other in order to minimise the uncertainty associated with interactions in open
distributed systems.
In more detail, trust has been deﬁned in a number of ways in diﬀerent domains (see Falcone
et al. (2001) for a general description). However, we ﬁnd the following deﬁnition most useful for our
purposes:
2 . .   .Trust is a belief an agent has that the other party will do what it says it will (being honest and
reliable) or reciprocate (being reciprocative for the common good of both), given an opportunity
to defect to get higher payoﬀs (adapted from (Dasgupta, 1998))1.
Broadly speaking, there are two main approaches to trust in multi-agent systems. Firstly, to allow
agents to trust each other, there is a need to endow them with the ability to reason about the
reciprocative nature, reliability, or honesty of their counterparts. This ability is captured through
trust models. The latter aim to enable agents to calculate the amount of trust they can place in their
interaction partners. A high degree of trust in an agent would mean it is likely to be chosen as
an interaction partner and (possibly) a reciprocative strategy used towards it over multiple
interactions. Conversely, a low degree of trust would result in it not being selected (if other, more
trusted, interaction partners are available) or a non-reciprocative strategy adopted against it over
multiple interactions (if there is no better alternative). In this way, trust models aim to guide an
agent’s decision making in deciding on how, when, and who to interact with. However, in order to
do so, trust models initially require agents to gather some knowledge about their counterparts’
characteristics. This can be achieved in many diﬀerent ways including: through inferences drawn
from the outcomes of multiple direct interactions with these partners or through indirect
information provided by others. The direct interaction case leads us to consider methods by which
agents can learn or evolve better strategies to deal with honest and dishonest agents such that
payoﬀs are maximised in the long run. The indirect interaction case requires agents to be able to
develop methods to reliably acquire and reason about the information gathered from other agents.
While trust models pertain to the reasoning and information gathering ability of agents, the
second main approach to trust concerns the design of protocols and mechanisms of interactions (i.e.
the rules of encounter). These interaction mechanisms need to be devised to ensure that those
involved can be sure they will gain some utility if they rightly deserve it (i.e. a malicious agent
cannot tamper with the correct payoﬀ allocation of the mechanism). Thus we expect agents to
interact using a particular mechanism only if it can be trusted. For example, an English auction can
be trusted (by the bidders) to some extent since it ensures that the auctioneer cannot tamper with
the bids since these are publicly voiced. However, the same auction cannot be trusted (by the
auctioneer) to elicit the bidders’ true valuation of the auctioned goods (because the dominant
strategy of this mechanism is to bid lower than one’s true valuation of the goods and slightly higher
than the current bid). This highlights the need for protocols that ensure that the participants will
ﬁnd no better option than telling the truth and interacting honestly with each other.
As can be seen, trust pervades multi-agent interactions at all levels. With respect to designing
agents and open multi-agent systems we therefore conceptualise trust in the following ways:
• individual-level trust, whereby an agent has some beliefs about the honesty or reciprocative
nature of its interaction partners;
• system-level trust, whereby the actors in the system are forced to be trustworthy by the rules of
encounter (i.e. protocols and mechanisms) that regulate the system2.
The above approaches can be seen as being complementary to each other. Thus, while protocols
aim to ensure the trustworthiness of agents at the system level, they cannot always achieve this
1 Note that there are many diﬀerent interpretations of trust and we cannot possibly cater for all of those.
Here, we provide a deﬁnition that we believe encompasses most of the models presented in the ﬁeld of
multi-agent systems. Thus, we not only consider trust arising from an agent fulﬁlling the terms of a contract,
but also from agents that reciprocate for the common good in the long run without making any contracts.
2 In what follows, we distinguish system-level trust borne out of strategic considerations in building
mechanisms (without necessary contractual commitments) from the control-trust mentioned in Tan and
Thoen (2000). The latter is more concerned with the level control exercised by transaction procedures without
any consideration for the particular strategic behaviour of agents in the system. We believe this is an
important distinction since system-level trust is not only concerned with agents performing correctly, as in
the case of control-trust, but also with incentivising them to provide information truthfully to the system and
other agents.
Trust in multi-agent systems 3objective without some loss in eﬃciency, and, in such cases, trust models at the individual level are
important in guiding an agent’s decision making. Similarly, where trust models at the individual
level cannot cope with the overwhelming uncertainty in the environment, system-level trust models,
through certain mechanisms, aim to constrain the interaction and reduce this uncertainty.
Generally speaking, the various issues concerning trust at these two levels have been dealt with
separately in the literature, each forming a diﬀerent piece of the puzzle, without any consideration
for how they all ﬁt together. To rectify this position, this paper presents a critique on the work that
has been carried out on trust in multi-agent systems. More speciﬁcally, we evaluate the most
prominent trust models that have been presented and show how they all ﬁt together at the
individual and at the system level. From this, we develop a general classiﬁcation of approaches to
trust in multi-agent systems and outline the open challenges that need to be addressed in order to
provide a comprehensive view of trust in computational systems.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 deals with models that ﬁt into the
individual aspect of trust. We describe and evaluate the trust models that have been devised using
learning and evolutionary techniques, reputation, and socio-cognitive concepts. Section 3 deals with
system-level trust where we illustrate diﬀerent mechanisms that enforce certain properties of the
interaction and hence the trustworthiness of agents involved. Section 4 concludes and outlines the
key future lines of research.
2 Individual-level trust
Here we take the viewpoint of an agent situated in an open environment trying to choose the most
reliable interaction partner from a pool of potential agents and deciding on the strategy to adopt
with it (i.e. the who, when, and how of interactions mentioned in Section 1). As we have indicated,
there are a number of ways the agent can go about doing this. Firstly, they could interact with each
of them and learn their behaviour over a number of encounters. Eventually, they should be able to
select the most reliable or honest agents from the pool or devise an appropriate strategy to deal with
the less (or more) reliable ones. In this case, the agent reasons about the outcome of the direct
interactions with others. Secondly, the agent could ask other agents about their perception of the
potential partners. If suﬃcient information is obtained and if this information can be trusted, the
agent can reliably choose its interaction partners. In this case, the agent reasons about interactions
that others have had with their potential partners (indirect interactions). Thirdly, the agent could
characterise the known motivations of the other agents. This involves forming coherent beliefs
about diﬀerent characteristics of these agents and reasoning about these beliefs in order to decide
how much trust should be put in them.
Given the above, we can classify trust models at the individual level as either learning (and
evolution) based, reputation based, or socio-cognitive based. While the learning and evolutionary
models aim to endow agents with strategies that can cope with lying and non-reciprocative agents,
reputation models enable agents to gather information in richer forms from their environment and
make rational inferences from the information obtained about their counterparts. Socio-cognitive
models adopt a rather higher level view of trust that takes the knowledge of motivations of other
agents for granted and proposes ways to reason about these motivations. The remainder of this
section follows this classiﬁcation and outlines the main models in each of the various categories.
2.1 Learning and evolving trust
In this section we consider trust as an emergent property of direct interactions between
self-interested agents. Here we assume that the agents will interact many times rather than through
one-shot interactions. This tallies with the concept of trust as a social phenomenon that is inherently
based on multiple interactions between two parties (Carley, 1991; Dasgupta, 1998; Yamagishi et al.,
1998; Molm et al., 2000; Prietula, 2000). It is further assumed that agents have an incentive to defect
4 . .   .(Dasgupta, 1998). For example, defecting in an interaction could mean that the agent does not
satisfy the terms of a contract, sells poor-quality goods, delivers late, or does not pay the requested
amount of money to a seller. In these examples, defection could get higher payoﬀs for the agent
defecting (e.g. the seller gets paid more than the actual value of the goods sold) and cause some
utility loss to the other party (e.g. the buyer loses utility in buying a low-quality product at a high
price). However, defection may reduce the possibility of future interactions since the losing agent
would typically attempt to avoid risking future utility losses. In contrast, if both interaction
participants cooperate, we assume that they get an overall higher payoﬀ in the long run (Axelrod,
1984). For example, a seller delivering goods on time or selling goods of a high quality may result
in future purchases from the buyer. In all these cases, we are generally assuming that the agents
already know the payoﬀs associated with each of their actions.
If the payoﬀs of each encounter are known, the agents can reason strategically by assessing the
best possible move of their opponent and hence devising their own best response. This analysis falls
within the realm of game theory (von Neuman & Morgenstern, 1944). The latter regards all
interactions as games with diﬀerent payoﬀs (e.g. winning or losing the game) for the individual
players (i.e. the interaction partners). Most games assume that the move of an opponent is not
known in advance. In such one-shot games, the safest (i.e. minimising possible loss), and not
necessarily the most proﬁtable, move will be chosen unless there can be some way to ascertain that
the other party can be trusted3. Thus, if an agent believes its counterpart is reciprocative, then the
former will never defect, otherwise it will, and both could end up with lower payoﬀs than if they
trusted each other or learnt to trust each other. This belief may only be acquired if the game is
repeated a number of times such that there is an opportunity for the agents to learn their opponent’s
strategy or adapt to each other’s strategy.
To this end we will ﬁrst consider models that show how trust, through reciprocation (of positive
deeds), can be learnt or evolved over multiple direct interactions (Section 2.1.1). These interaction
models, however, greatly simplify the interactions to extreme notions of cooperation and defection.
In reality we believe these two extremes can rather be considered the two ends of an axis measuring
the success of the outcome of the interaction. In this context, cooperation could mean, for example,
that a seller actually delivers some goods (rather than not delivering at all), but some slight delay
in the delivery might still be considered poor cooperation (rather than complete defection). Hence
the perception of an agent of another party’s trustworthiness is relative to the level of satisfaction
of the outcome. We therefore consider, in Section 2.1.2., how the payoﬀs in the individual
interactions can actually be modelled in realistic applications.
2.1.1 Evolving and learning strategies
The most common example used to illustrate the evolution of trust or cooperation over multiple
interactions is Axelrod’s tournaments revolving around the Prisoner’s Dilemma4 Axelrod, 1984).
Within very controlled settings, Axelrod’s tournaments have shown that the tit-for-tat strategy was
the most successful (reaping higher average points over all the encounters) relative to other selﬁsh
or nicer (i.e. mostly cooperative) strategies. Tit-for-tat cooperates on the ﬁrst move and imitates the
opponent’s move in the remaining interactions. By adopting this strategy, agents are, in fact,
trusting each other but would punish untrustworthy behaviour if it ever happens (and also forgive
if trustworthy behaviour is shown again). If two agents adopt tit-for-tat (or permanently
3 The moves chosen will also be dependent on the risk attitude (risk seeking, risk neutral, or risk averse) of
the agent. In this respect, we conceive of trust as a means to minimise the risk perceived by the agent
(Dasgupta, 1998; Yamagishi et al. 1998; Molm et al. 2000.
4 The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a game involving two prisoners that have to decide whether to cooperate by not
revealing their accomplice’s deeds or to defect by revealing this information. The dilemma arises as a result of
each other having to separately (in diﬀerent rooms) decide to cooperate or not, resulting in some years of
imprisonment (5 for one cooperating and 1 for the one defecting,3for both if they both defect and 1 for both
if they both cooperate). In the face of such uncertainty the best strategy proves to be defection even though
this does not lead to the best outcomes, hence the dilemma.
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strategies. However, when faced with other selﬁsh strategies, tit-for-tat does not get the maximum
payoﬀ, although it actually gets a higher payoﬀ than most other strategies. This is because tit-for-tat
loses on the ﬁrst encounter.
It is therefore required that an agent adapts its strategy according to the type of environment
(agents therein) they encounter in order to minimise losses and foster cooperation. By allowing
agents to adapt, Wu and Sun have shown that trust can actually emerge between them (Wu & Sun,
2001). This means that the agents evolve a trusting relationship (i.e. a cooperative strategy) by
evaluating the beneﬁt of each possible strategy over multiple interactions. A multi-agent bidding
context, in which a number of seller agents bid for contracts in an electronic marketplace, is chosen
to exemplify the concept. It is ﬁrst shown that when agents are all nice (always cooperating) to each
other, sellers tend to learn to exploit them. To counter this, the nice agents learn to use tit-for-tat
to minimise their losses. As a result, the nasty sellers (exploitative agents) then learn to be
reciprocative since cooperating would bring them more beneﬁt than defecting in the long run. Thus,
trust emerges as a result of the evolution of strategies over multiple interactions. This example also
shows that the evolution of strategies allows nice agents to beat nasty ones in the long run.
However, while strictly applying to the bidding context, Wu and Sun’s model does not take into
account the fact that there might be some utility loss (in the short run) in cooperating with the other
party (e.g. giving away some resources).
In this respect, while acknowledging a cost to cooperation, Sen (1996)5 demonstrates how
reciprocity can emerge when the agents learn to predict that they will receive future beneﬁts if they
cooperate. In a more recent set of experiments, Sen and Dutta give clear guidelines about
evolutionary stable strategies (Sen & Dutta, 2002) (not necessarily tit-for-tat) in diﬀerent types of
environments (with diﬀerent sorts of strategies). They show that collaborative liars (collaborating
defectors) perform well whenever the number of interactions is small and the number of
philanthropic agents (always cooperating) is large. However, reciprocative strategies perform better
in all other scenarios they tested. Besides proving that reciprocation pays, these results show that
the length and number of interactions matter when it comes to evaluating another agent’s
trustworthiness. If the number of interactions is too low, then trust cannot be built. This is
corroborated by Mui et al. (2002) in their probabilistic trust model which identiﬁes a threshold for
the number of encounters needed to achieve a reliable measure of an opponent’s trustworthiness
based on performance appraisal.
In the case where this threshold cannot be reached, other techniques must be used to elicit
trustworthiness. In this respect, Mukherjee et al. (2001) have shown how trust can be acquired if
agents know their opponent’s chosen move in advance. They show that, in the case where the agents
do not reveal or only partially reveal (only the ﬁrst mover does) their actions before their opponent
acts, no amount of trust is built since it is optimal for the opponent to always choose to defect.
However, in the bilateral information revealing scenario (both agents reveal their actions), both
agents trust each other through mutually learning to choose an action that results in higher
outcomes than predicted for the non-learning situation. It is to be noted that their model (as well
as Sen’s), besides assuming a static environment, uses an arbitrarily deﬁned function to calculate the
cost of interacting and returns from future actions (the basis of which might need more
investigation but has proven to be quite successful in the applications that have been simulated).
Up to this point, all the above models deal strictly with the problem of cooperation between
self-interested parties. However, not all multi-agent interactions are strictly competitive. For
example, agents may be self-interested, but still need to achieve a maximum payoﬀ as a group or
society since the latter determines their individual payoﬀs (e.g. individuals contributing an
unspeciﬁed amount of money to build a road in their community – the total amount collected
decides whether the road will be built, giving utility to the individuals, otherwise the money is used
5 For a wider reading on the problem of learning cooperative strategies in competitive settings, see
Mukherjee et al. (2001) and Biswas et al. (2000).
6 . .   .for a secondary purpose). This is the problem tackled by Birk (2000, 2001). It is thus shown that
trust may not only emerge from the evolution of strategies (Birk, 2000), but can also arise strictly
out of learning (Birk, 2001). The learning method Birk exposes uses a continuous case N-prisoner’s
dilemma as a basis for simulation. This involves agents contributing to a common fund required for
the society to achieve its goals, but each agent is tempted to contribute less than the equal split of
the total investment required, in the hope that others will contribute more. In this context, a
cooperative strategy (i.e. contributing more than the equal split) gradually predominates in an
environment where bad agents (i.e. contributing less) are in the majority. This is because the low
investment obtained by the society impacts negatively on the utility of each individual member as
well, forcing the latter to learn to cooperate to get higher payoﬀs. However, as the number of
cooperative agents increases, the agents learn to defect again to get better payoﬀs (this is similar to
what Wu and Sun’s model predicts). Birk’s results additionally show that the society reaches an
equilibrium with a high level of trust (or cooperation) among its members.
The above learning and evolutionary models of multi-agent strategic interactions assume
complete information (e.g. strategies, payoﬀ matrix) for the multi-agent learning algorithms to
work. These results have typically been obtained through simulations using very strict assumptions
and settings rather than real-life scenarios where the main assumption of complete information
about payoﬀs simply does not hold. Also, most of the learning models conceive the outcome of
interactions as being bi-stable, that is, either a defection or cooperation. To be more realistic, we
believe agents need to infer, from the information gathered through their direct interactions, how
their opponents are performing and how their performance is aﬀecting their goals. This leads on to
devising realistic trust metrics.
2.1.2 Trust metrics
For an agent to computationally model its trust in its opponent, it is ﬁrst required that the former
can ascribe a rating to the level of performance of its opponent. The latter’s performance over
multiple interactions can then be assessed to check how good and consistent it is at doing what it
says it will. Therefore, in addition to a performance rating, an agent also needs a means of keeping
track of the performance of an agent (in its direct interactions with it). To this end, Witkowski
et al. (2001) propose a model whereby the trust in an agent is calculated based on their performance
in past interactions (the context is a trading scenario for an intelligent telecommunications network
where bandwidth is traded, the quality and quantity of which is varied depending on the trust
suppliers and buyers have in each other). The update to the trust value is diﬀerent for the diﬀerent
types of agents deﬁned in the system. Speciﬁcally, consumers update their trust value according to
the diﬀerence between their bids and the received goods (bandwidth in this case). The better the
quality (size) of the goods the higher the increase in trust and conversely for low-quality goods. A
higher trust in a seller would then result in it being chosen for future purchases (conversely for low
trust). In contrast, the supplier agents update their trust in the consumers according to the extent
to which the quality (size) of the goods (bandwidth) supplied has been exploited. If the quality
oﬀered was not fully used, then the trust goes down since it implies that the consumer has
dishonestly asked for more than they actually needed. If the quality is fully exploited, the trust goes
up. Results of the experiments show how trust (of consumers in suppliers) is eﬀectively strongly
dependent on the ability of suppliers to cope with the demand6.
The model used by Witkowski et al. simpliﬁes the calculation of trust through equations that
deal with measurable quantities of bandwidth allocation and bandwidth use. Other models such as
those of Mui et al. (2002), Sen and Sajja (2002) and Schillo et al. (2000) consider the performance
6 It is to be noted, however, that their model increases an agent’s trust even if the performance of its
opponent has not been faultless (e.g. a buyer not using the bandwidth completely but partially). This allows
the opponent to exploit the agent so long as the opponent is not ‘‘completely defecting’’. While this property
of the model may not harm the system analysed by the authors, it seems to be counterintuitive to the ideal
attributes of a trust model which should prevent the agent implementing it being exploited.
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of the agents for the speciﬁc simulation settings studied, they cannot generally be used more widely
because realistic interactions in an open distributed system involve richer outcomes (e.g. quality of
goods traded, eﬃciency of task handling, duration of task). To overcome this, we need more generic
means of assessing performance over time. To this end, Sabater and Sierra (2002) (through the
REGRET system) do not just limit the overall performance to a bi-stable value or to an eﬃciency
measure (as per Witkowski et al.), but rather attribute some fuzziness to the notion of performance.
Thus, depending on the context, the performance of an agent can be subjectively judged on a given
scale where −1 represents very poor performance,0represents neutral, and +1 represents being
very good. REGRET actually gives richer semantics to ratings (or impressions) by deﬁning their
particular characteristics. For example, an agent can express a satisfaction −0.5 for the delivery date
of some goods and +1 for the price of the same goods. These impressions are then analysed and
aggregated using fuzzy reasoning techniques to elicit a representative value for the overall
impression (or trust) of one agent on another.
In contrast to Witkowski et al.’s model, REGRET’s evaluation of trust is not only based on an
agent’s direct perception of its opponent’s reliability, but it also evaluates its behaviour with other
agents in the system. This is carried out because only perceiving direct interactions can pose a
number of problems. For example, in an open system, it would be very diﬃcult for an autonomous
agent to select an interaction partner if the agent itself had never interacted with another party (i.e.
it has no history to analyse). Moreover, the method opens itself to attack by strategic liars which,
knowing how they are rated by the other side, can adapt their behaviour (e.g. clients overloading
their channels) to make the other party believe it is trustworthy (i.e. fully using its bandwidth). In
such cases an agent could be better oﬀ evaluating other environmental parameters (such as asking
other agents about their impressions of each other) in an attempt to get a more reliable rating of
their opponents. However, a number of problems arise in doing this. For example, information
gathered from other agents could be wrong or incomplete. Such problems are exempliﬁed and
studied in Section 2.2.
2.2 Reputation models
Reputation can be deﬁned as the opinion or view of someone about something (Sabater & Sierra,
2002). Here we consider that this view can be mainly derived from an aggregation of opinions of
members of the community about one of them7. In multi-agent systems, reputation can be useful
when there are a large number of agents interacting (e.g. online auctions, stock-trading).
Reputation should, for example, enable buyers to choose the best sellers in the system (e.g. on eBay,
the buyers rate the sellers they interact with and this rating is provided to future buyers for them
to choose the most reliable seller(s)). Moreover, reputation can induce sellers to behave well if they
know they are going to be avoided by future buyers as a result of their reputation going down due
to bad behaviour. These diﬀerent aspects of reputation divide the ﬁeld into the following lines of
research:
• devising methods to gather ratings that deﬁne the trustworthiness of an agent, using relationships
existing between members of the community;
• devising reliable reasoning methods to gather as much information from the aggregation of
ratings retrieved from the community;
• devising mechanisms to promote ratings that truly describe the trustworthiness of an agent.
7 Here we distinguish between trust and reputation in the sense that the former is derived from direct
interactions while the latter is mainly acquired (by an agent about another) from the environment or other
agents and ultimately leads to trust. This distinction is only made to facilitate the study of diﬀerent models
presented, rather than to prescribe such an approach to trust and reputation.
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system-level trust). For now we will be concerned with the ﬁrst two items because these are at the
level of individual agents.
In order to organise the retrieval and aggregation of ratings from other agents, most reputation
models borrow the concept of a social network from sociology (Burt, 1982; Buskens, 1998). Similar
to human societies, this assumes that agents are related to each other whenever they have roles that
interconnect them or whenever they have communication links (e.g. by observation, direct
communication, or as information sources) established between one another. Through this network
of social relationships, it is assumed that agents, acting as witnesses of interactions, can transmit
information about each other (Panzarasa et al., 2001). Information takes the form of a performance
rating (e.g. good or bad, seller delivers late, buyer never paid) as explained in Section 2.1.2. Such
a rating could then be shared by the diﬀerent nodes of the social network, thus giving rise to the
concept of reputation.
2.2.1 Retrieving ratings from the social network
Yu and Singh (2000a) tackle the problem of retrieving ratings from a social network through the
use of referrals. In this context, referrals are pointers to other sources of information similar to links
that a search engine would plough through to obtain a Web page or url. Through referrals, an agent
can provide another agent with alternative sources of information about a potential interaction
partner (particularly if the former cannot handle the latter’s request itself). Yu and Singh propose
a method of representing a social network (based on a referral network (Singh et al., 2001)) and
then provide techniques to gather information through the network (Yu & Singh, 2003).
Speciﬁcally, they show how agents can explore a network by contacting their neighbours and can
use referrals gathered from the latter to gradually build up a model of the social network.
Furthermore, Schillo et al. (2000) enrich the representation of an existing social network by
annotating nodes of the network to represent their particular characteristics. Thus each node of the
network holds two values:( i) the trust value which describes the degree of honesty of the agent
represented by the node; and (ii) the degree of altruism (i.e. being good to others even at the expense
of one’s own utility). Both of these values are used to deduce the trustworthiness of witnesses
queried at the time of calculating the reputation of potential interaction partners (see Section 2.2.2).
From an established social network it is then possible to derive higher-level concepts. For example,
Sabater and Sierra (2002) and Yu and Singh (2002a) derive the concept of a group or neighbours
from the social network by identifying those nodes (agents) that are close together (linked together).
Thus, having a social network represented allows an agent to select and contact those agents they
need in order to get a proper measure of the reputation of another agent. For example, Yu and
Singh’s model takes into account ratings from those agents that are close (by virtue of the number
of links separating them with a potential interaction partner) to choose witnesses for a particular
agent. Underlying this is the assumption that closer witnesses will return more reliable ratings.
It is further assumed, in all of the above models, that witnesses share ratings freely (i.e. without
any proﬁt). This is a relatively strong assumption which can be removed if proper mechanisms are
implemented (as will be seen in Section 3.2). Therefore, given that agents have represented their
social network and properly extracted the ratings of their counterparts from the network, they then
need to aggregate these ratings so as to form a coherent impression of their potential interaction
partners.
2.2.2 Aggregating ratings
Several means of aggregating ratings in online communities already exist. For example, on eBay,
ratings are +1 or −1 values (in addition to textual information) that are summed up to give an
overall rating. Such a simplistic aggregation of ratings can be unreliable, particularly when some
buyers do not return ratings (see Kollock (1999) and (Resnick & Zeckhauser, 2002) for a complete
account of online reputation systems). For example, a sum of ratings is biased positively when there
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Having no rating is not considered as a bad rating, nor as a good rating, and is simply discarded
from the aggregation. Moreover, ratings are open to manipulation by sellers trying to build their
reputation. While the latter problem can be dealt with by designing sophisticated reputation
mechanisms (see Section 3.2), the former problem can be solved at the level of the agent’s reasoning
mechanism.
To this end, Yu and Singh (2002b) deal with absence of information in their reputation model.
The main contribution of their work is in aggregating information obtained from referrals while
coping with the lack of information. More speciﬁcally, they use the Dempster Shafter theory of
evidence to model information retrieved (Yager et al., 1994). The context is the following: an agent
may receive good or bad ratings (+1 or −1) about another agent. When an agent receives no rating
(good or bad), how should it classify this case? In Yu and Singh’s model, a lack of belief (or
disbelief) can only be considered as a state of uncertainty (where all beliefs have an equal
probability of being true). Dempster’s rule allows the combination of beliefs obtained from various
sources (saying an agent is trustworthy, untrustworthy, or unknown to be trustworthy or not) to be
combined so as to support the evidence that a particular agent is trustworthy or not. Moreover,
together with a belief derived from ratings obtained, an agent may hold a belief locally about the
trustworthiness of another due to its direct interaction with it. However, in such cases, the ratings
obtained from witnesses are neglected. Nevertheless, their measure of reputation does not discredit
nor give credit unnecessarily to agents (as eBay does) in the absence of information.
As can be seen, Yu and Singh do not deal with the possibility that an agent may lie about its
rating of another agent. They assume all witnesses are totally trustworthy. However, an agent could
obtain some beneﬁt by lying about their rating of an opponent if they are able to discredit others
so that they appear to be more reliable than them. In this respect, Schillo et al. (2000) deal with the
problem of lying witnesses. They ﬁrst decompose the rating into social metrics of trust and altruism
(as discussed above – see Section 2.2.1). The latter metrics are used in a recursive aggregation over
the network taking into consideration the probability that the witnesses queried may lie to (or
betray) the querying agent. In this way, the value obtained for the trust in an agent is more reliable
than fully trusting witnesses as in the case of Yu and Singh’s model (which assumes cooperative
settings). The probability of a witness lying to the querying agent is actually learnt over multiple
interactions in Schillo et al.’s model. Similarly, Sen et al. extend this work and demonstrate how
agents can cope with lying witnesses in their environment through learning rather than attributing
subjective probabilities to the event of a witness lying (Sen et al., 2000; Sen & Sajja, 2002).
Speciﬁcally, they develop a reputation model which makes the same simplifying assumptions as
those illustrated in Section 2.1. Their approach shows how the sharing of trust values (or
reputation) can beneﬁt reciprocative agents in the long run. In the short run though, selﬁsh and
lying agents still beneﬁt from totally reciprocative agents. Furthermore, it is shown that, over time,
colluding agents cannot exploit reciprocative agents if these learn the behaviour of the former and
share their experience with others of a similar type. The reciprocative agents then become selﬁsh
towards these lying and completely selﬁsh agents so as to minimise utility loss in interacting with
them. Their model, however, fails when the number of witnesses in the environment falls below a
given threshold. This is because a suﬃciently high number of witnesses is needed to report ratings
about most lying agents in population. If this is not the case, there is a higher probability of a
reciprocative agent interacting with a lying one which has not previously been encountered by the
witnesses.
While Yu and Singh’s model demonstrates the power of referrals and the eﬀectiveness of
Dempster Shafter’s theory of evidence in modelling reputation, Schillo et al.’s and Sen et al.’s
models show how witness information can be reliably used to reason eﬀectively against lying agents.
These models, however, greatly simplify direct interactions and fail to frame such interactions
within the social setting (i.e. relative to the type of relationships that exist between the witnesses and
the potential interaction partners). To overcome this limitation, Sabater and Sierra (2002) adopt a
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tative of the trust to be placed in the opponent, is a weighted sum of subjective impressions
derived from direct interactions (the individual dimension of reputation), the group impression of
the opponent, the group impression on the opponent’s group, and the agent’s impression on the
opponent’s group (together, all of these compose the social dimension of reputation). Now, the
weights on each term allow the agent to variably adjust the importance given to ratings obtained
in these diverse ways. Moreover, older ratings, devised as shown in Section 2.2.1, are given less
importance relative to new ones. The strong realism of REGRET also lies in its deﬁnition of an
ontological dimension that agents can share to understand each other’s ratings (e.g. a travel agent
being good might imply low price for one agent, but may imply good quality seats reserved for
another). However, REGRET does not handle the problem of lying (strategically) among agents.
Ratings are obtained in a cooperative manner (from an altruistic group) rather than in a
competitive setting (where witnesses are selﬁsh). Moreover, the aggregation method REGRET uses
can be sensitive to noise since ratings are simply summed up. In contrast, Mui et al.’s model
calculates the probability of an agent being trustworthy on the next interaction by considering the
frequency of (positive and negative) direct impressions conditional upon the impressions gathered
from the social network (Mui et al., 2002). This approach, we believe, is less sensitive to noisy
ratings from the network.
2.3 Socio-cognitive models of trust
The approaches to modelling trust at the individual level that we have considered in the previous
sections are all based on an assessment of the outcomes of interactions. For example, learning
models consider the payoﬀs of each individual strategy, while reputation models assess outcomes
of both direct and indirect interactions (i.e. third-party assessments). However, in assessing the
trustworthiness of an opponent, it may also be important to consider the subjective perception8 on
the latter since it enables a more comprehensive analysis of the characteristics of the opponent
(Dasgupta, 1998; Gambetta, 1998). For example, the tools and abilities available to that opponent
could be (subjectively) assessed to check whether or not the agent can indeed use these to carry out
an agreed task. Such beliefs or notions are normally stored in an agent’s mental state and are
essential in assessing an agent’s reliability in doing what they say they will (i.e. being capable), or
their willingness to do what they say they will (i.e. being honest).
In this respect, we report the line of work initiated by Castelfranchi and Falcone (Castelfranchi
& Falcone, 1998, 2000a, b; Falcone & Castelfranchi, 2001). In particular, they highlight the
importance of a cognitive view of trust (particularly for Belief–Desire–Intention agents
(Wooldridge, 2002)) in contrast to a mere quantitative view of trust (Sections 2.1 and 2.2).
The context they choose is that of task delegation where an agent x wishes to delegate a task to
agent y. In so doing agent x needs to evaluate the trust it can place in y by considering the diﬀerent
beliefs it has about the motivations of agent y. They claim the following beliefs are essential (in x’s
mental state) to determine the amount of trust to be put in agent y by agent x (these have been
adapted and summarised).
• Competence belief: a positive evaluation of y by x saying that y is capable of carrying out the
delegated task as expected. If agent y is not capable, there is no point in trusting them to
accomplish the task fully.
• Willingness9 belief: x believes that y has decided and intends to do what they have proposed to
do. If agent y is not believed to be willing to do the task, they might be lying if they say they want
to do so. This would then decrease x’s trust in y.
8 By subjective, we mean that these beliefs are formed according to the assessment of the environment and
the opponent’s characteristics which could also include an analysis of past interactions.
9 In order to have this belief, agent x needs to model the mental attitudes of agent y.
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9 belief: x believes that y is stable enough about their intention to do what they have
proposed to do. If y is known to be unstable, then there is added risk in interacting with y, hence
a low trust would be put in y even though they might be willing to do the task at the point the
task is delegated.
• Motivation belief: x believes that y has some motives to help x, and that these motives will
probably prevail over other motives negative to x in case of conﬂict. This highlights the
possibility for y to defect as argued in Section 2.1. The motives mentioned here are the same as
the long-term gains obtainable in helping x achieve their goals. If y is believed to be motivated
(to be helpful or positively reciprocative as in Section 2.1), then x will tend to trust them.
To devise the level of trust agent x can place in agent y, agent x would need to consider each of
the above beliefs (and possibly others). These beliefs actually impact on trust, each in a diﬀerent
way, and these need to be taken into account in a comprehensive evaluation of all beliefs concerned.
For example, the competence belief is a pre-requisite to trust another agent, while the motivation
belief would vary according to the calculation of the future payoﬀs to the agents over multiple
interactions. This kind of strategic consideration becomes even more important when such beliefs
are known to all actors (i.e. the preferences of agents are public). For example, what could happen
if agent y knows that x trusts them, or relies on them? The authors claim that this may increase the
trustworthiness of x in y’s mind, the self-conﬁdence of y, or their willingness to serve x, which in
turn changes the trustworthiness of y. Agent x can then take into account the possible eﬀects of
their trust in y (even before performing the delegation) to support their decision of delegating.
However, Castelfranchi and Falcone’s approach is strongly motivated by humans which are not
always rational beings (as opposed to what we expect agents to be)10
As opposed to the cognitive approach of Castelfranchi and Falcone, Brainov and Sandholm
(1999) support the need to model an opponent’s trust (as described above) with a rational approach
(they speciﬁcally target the context of non-enforceable contracts). They do so by showing that if an
agent has a precise estimation of its opponent’s trust (in the former), this leads to maximum payoﬀs
and trade between the two agents. However, if trust is not properly estimated, it leads to an
ineﬃcient allocation of resources between the agents involved (hence a loss in utility) since
both underestimate or overestimate their oﬀers on exchanged contracts. It is also shown that it is
in the best interests of the agents, given some reasonable assumptions, to actually reveal their
trustworthiness in their interaction partner (to eﬃciently allocate resources)!
While still in its infancy, the socio-cognitive approach to modelling trust takes a high-level view
of the subject. However, it lacks the rational grounding (as shown by Brainov and Sandholm) in
rational mechanisms which learning and reputation models (and mechanisms) provide. In eﬀect, the
socio-cognitive approach could exploit the assessment performed by these models to form the core
beliefs illustrated above. Thus, speaking generally, all the individual models of trust could
contribute to a comprehensive evaluation of trust at the individual level. This would take into
account strategies learnt over multiple interactions, the reputation of potential interaction partners,
and ﬁnally the latter’s believed motivations and abilities regarding the interaction. However, it can
be computationally expensive for an agent to reason about all the diﬀerent factors aﬀecting their
trust in their opponents. Moreover, as highlighted earlier, agents are limited in their capacity to
gather information from various sources that populate their environment. Given these limitations,
instead of imposing the need to devise trust at the individual level, it can be more appropriate to
shift the focus to the rules of encounter so that these ensure that interaction partners are forced to
be trustworthy. In this way, these rules of encounter can, at times, compensate for the limited
applicability of individual-level trust models (conversely, whenever the rules of encounter cannot
10 Castelfranchi and Falcone do not show what agent y would gain in trusting x in the case presented here. If
we consider rational agents to be utility maximising with respect to the goals set by their human designers,
then agent y has no apparent reason to trust x more than they should if there is no gain in doing so, and it
would be irrational to do so (from our deﬁnition of rationality).
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trust models to do so).
3 System-level trust
In the context of open multi-agent systems, we conceive of agents interacting via a number of
mechanisms or protocols that dictate the rules of encounter. Examples of such mechanisms include
auctions, voting, contract-nets, market mechanisms, and bargaining, to name but a few (see
Sandholm, 1999) for an overview of these). These mechanisms take agents to be completely
self-interested and therefore need to make sure that the rules of encounter prevent lying and
collusion between participants. Generally speaking, such requirements impose some rigidity on the
system (e.g. an English auction forces bidders to reveal their bids). However, these rules enable an
agent to trust other agents by virtue of the diﬀerent constraints imposed by the system. These
constraints can be applied in a number of ways. Firstly, it is sometimes possible to engineer the
protocol of interaction such that the participating agents ﬁnd no gain in utility by lying or
colluding. Secondly, an agent’s reputation as being a liar (or truthful) can be spread by the system.
Thus, knowing that their future interactions will be compromised if they are reputed to be liars,
agents can be forced to act well (up to the point they leave a system). Thirdly, agents can be screened
upon entering the system by providing proof of their reliability through the references of a trusted
third party.
Against this background, we subdivide system-level trust in terms of (i) devising truth-eliciting
interaction protocols,( ii) developing reputation mechanisms that foster trustworthy behaviour, and
(iii) developing security mechanisms that ensure new entrants can be trusted. This is the structure
that we adopt in the following subsections.
3.1 Truth-eliciting interaction protocols
In order to ensure truth-telling on the part of agents involved in an interaction, a number of
protocols and mechanisms have been devised in recent years (see Sandholm (1999) for an overview).
These protocols aim to prevent agents from lying or speculating while interacting (e.g. lying about
the quality of goods sold or proposing a higher price than one’s true valuation for goods to be
bought). They do so by imposing rules dictating the individual steps in the interaction and the
information revealed by the agents during the interaction. Thus, by adhering to such protocols it
is expected that agents should ﬁnd no better option than telling the truth. Given the aim of this
paper, we do not wish to delve into a detailed explanation of all available protocols (i.e. the
Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) class of mechanisms) that have such properties and enforce them
to a certain degree (see Mas-Colell et al. (1995) and Dash et al. (2003) for such a wider analysis).
Rather we will focus on one such protocol (namely auctions, since these are the most widely used
mechanism in multi-agent system applications).
There are four main types of single-sided auctions, namely the English, Dutch, First-price-sealed-
bid, and Vickrey. In the English auction, each bidder is free to raise his bid until no bidder is willing
to raise any further, thus ending the auction. The Dutch auction instead starts with a very high ask
price and reduces it in steps until one of the bidders bids for the item and wins the auction. The
First-price-sealed-bid involves agents submitting their bids without knowing others’ bids. The
highest bidder wins the auction. In the Vickrey auction, the bids are sealed but the winner pays the
price of the second highest bid.
In this context, the Dutch and English auctions enforce truth-telling on the part of the auctioneer
(e.g. the winner and the winning price cannot be faked) since bids are made publicly (as opposed
to Vickrey and First-price-sealed-bid auctions where the bids are hidden). However, the Dutch,
English, and First-price-sealed-bid auctions do not ensure that the bidders reveal their true
valuation of the goods at stake. This is because the dominant strategy in these auctions is to reveal
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amount more than the current highest bid up to one’s true valuation (in the case of the English
auction). In contrast, the Vickrey auction does enforce truth-telling by bidders and is a common
example of the class of VCG mechanisms. Here, a bidder’s dominant strategy is to bid its true
valuation since doing otherwise, given uncertainty about other bids and the ﬁnal price to be paid,
would result in some loss in utility. Bidding higher than its true valuation could end up with the
agent paying more than its valuation and bidding lower than its true valuation could make it lose
the auction altogether.
As pointed out above, the main weakness of the Vickrey mechanism is that it does not ensure
truth-telling on the part of the auctioneer. The latter could still lie about the winning bid since bids
are private and known only to the auctioneer (and obviously to each of the bidders in private, unless
there is some amount of collusion). The auctioneer could thus ask for a higher price than the second
highest bid (just below the highest bid) from the highest bidder. In so doing, the auctioneer reaps
a higher beneﬁt than it should without the bidders knowing. In this respect, Hsu and Soo (2002)
have implemented a secure (i.e. ensuring the privacy of bids and the allocation of the goods to the
true winner) multi-agent Vickrey auction scheme. The scheme diﬀers from the original Vickrey
auction in that it involves an additional step of choosing the auctioneer from among the bidders
(advertised on a blackboard). The bidders submit their encrypted bids to a blackboard. The
auctioneer is selected at random from the bidders and it is given a key to access all sealed bids.
Using this key, it can only compare the bids’ values. Thus, the auctioneer can only determine the
order of bids and allocate the second highest bid to the winner. This scheme also allows the
auctioneer (also a bidder), the winner, and the second highest bidder to verify the result by using
their keys to check the bids shown on the blackboard.
However, the Vickrey auction, and the other main ones stated above, are not collusion proof.
This means that agents can collaborate to cheat the mechanism by sharing information about their
bids. Collusion would ﬁrst necessitate that the agents know each other before they place their bids
and therefore arrange to place bids that do not reveal their true preferences (e.g. agents withholding
their bids in a Dutch auction until the ask price has gone very low, or some bidders colluding with
the auctioneer to artiﬁcially raise the ask price in an English auction to force others to pay a very
high price, or bidders colluding to beat competitors in a Vickrey auction). To prevent the latter from
happening, Brandt (2001, 2002) extends the work of Hsu and Soo by devising a collusion proof
auction mechanism that ensures the privacy and correctness of any (M+1)th-price auction (i.e. an
auction where the highest M bidders win and pay a uniform price determined by the (M+1)th
price). In this type of auction, bids are sealed and the highest bid wins the auction but pays a price
determined by the auctioneer (e.g. in the Vickrey auction the second highest price is paid). Only the
auctioneer and the bidder know the highest bid. To allow bidders to verify whether the winning bid
is actually the highest (hence checking the trustworthiness of the winner and auctioneer) the
protocol devised by Brandt distributes the calculation of the selling price between the individual
buyers using some cryptographic techniques. However, the only other agent, apart from the seller,
able to calculate the exact value of the selling price is the winner of the auction. The protocol also
ensures that bids are binding. These conditions, combined with the fact that the protocol can be
publicly veriﬁed, allow the identiﬁcation of malicious bidders which would have tampered with the
bids and prevent collusion from aﬀecting a single bidder. While being very powerful, the protocol is
computationally expensive for a large number of agents but works well for small numbers.
As can be seen above, most auctions are not robust to lying and collusion unless some security
mechanism is added into them (i.e. using cryptographic techniques). The protocols mentioned
above, besides constraining interactions, neglect the fact that the agents in an open distributed
system might want to interact more than once. As was shown in Section 2.1, reciprocative or
trustworthy behaviour can be elicited if agents can be punished in future interactions or strictly
prevented from engaging in future interactions if they do not interact honestly. For example, if a
winning bidder in an auction has been found to have lied about its preferences, it could be prevented
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future due to bad behaviour in the present, it will ﬁnd no better option but to act in a trustworthy
way. In this respect, earlier in the paper (see Section 2.1) we have shown how agents could learn to
actually adapt their strategy (reciprocative or not) in order to maximise their long term payoﬀs
against diﬀerent strategies over multiple runs of an auction.
However, as pointed out in Section 1, open multi-agent systems allow agents to interact with any
other agent in the environment. This could allow malicious agents to move from group to group
whenever they are detected by a given group of agents and therefore exploit trustworthy agents as
they move around. In order to prevent this from happening, agents can be made to share their
ratings of their opponent with other agents in the environment once they have interacted with them.
Techniques to allow agents to gather ratings and aggregate those in a sensible way were presented
in Section 2.2. However, it was shown that these techniques do not consider the fact that we expect
agents to share (true) ratings only if it brings them some utility. In open multi-agent systems, this
can be achieved through reputation mechanisms which we discuss in the next section.
3.2 Reputation mechanisms
As was seen in Section 2.2, the reputation models described do not take into account the fact that
the agents are selﬁsh and therefore will not share information unless some beneﬁt can be derived
from doing so. Furthermore, these reputation models (e.g. REGRET or Yu and Singh’s model) do
not motivate the use of reputation by some agents to elicit good behaviour from other agents. These
models aim to endow agents with a better perception of their opponent and do not consider the
eﬀect of doing so on an opponent when the latter is aware of it! Given these shortcomings of
reputation models, reputation mechanisms consider the problem of inducing trustworthy behaviour
and modelling the reputation of agents at the system level. Reputation mechanisms can operate
through centralised or distributed entities that store ratings provided by agents about their
interaction partners and then publicise these ratings, such that all agents in the environment have
access to them. In this case, it is the system that manages the aggregation and retrieval of ratings
as opposed to reputation models which leave the task to the agents themselves. In so doing,
reputation mechanisms can be used to deter lying and bad behaviour on the part of the agents.
Moreover, reputation mechanisms aim to induce truthful ratings from witnesses and actually make
it rational for agents to give ratings about each other to the system. Such a mechanism, that makes
it rational for participants to use it, is said to be incentive compatible (Resnick & Zeckhauser, 2002).
More speciﬁcally, Zacharia and Maes have outlined the desiderata for reputation mechanisms,
particularly with regards to how ratings are aggregated and how these impact on the behaviour of
the actors in the system (Zacharia & Maes, 2000). They do not propose such requirements for
agent-based reputation systems per se, but as we move into agent-mediated electronic commerce
(He et al., 2003b), it is obvious that such mechanisms will guide agent-based reputation systems.
These desiderata are listed below.
1. It should be costly to change identities in the community. This should prevent agents from entering
the system, behaving badly, and coming out of the system without any loss of utility or future
punishment bearing upon them.
2. New entrants should not be penalised by initially having low reputation values attributed to them.
If new entrants have low reputation they are less favoured though they might be totally
trustworthy. This actually makes the system less appealing to agents (with bad reputation)
intending to (re-)enter the system.
3. Agents with low ratings should be allowed to build up reputation similar to a new entrant. This
allows an agent to correct its behaviour if it has been shown to be badly behaving in the past.
4. The overhead of performing fake transactions should be high. This prevents agents from building
their own reputation.
5. Agents having a high reputation should have higher bearing than others on reputation values they
attribute to an agent. This presupposes that agents with high reputation will give truthful ratings
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acquires since it could lead to the creation of monopolies or cartels in the market.
6. Agents should be able to provide personalised evaluations. This involves giving more than just a
simple rating of +1 to −1 to allow a better evaluation of the reputation of another agent. For
example, the REGRET system implements richer ratings that can be shared using the
ontological dimension (see Section 2.2.2).
7. Agents should keep a memory of reputation values and give more importance to the latest
ones obtained. This is needed to keep the reputation measure as up to date as possible
and helps prevent an agent from building up a positive reputation by interacting well
and then starting to defect (the last defection having a greater eﬀect than its past good
behaviour).
With respect to the above requirements, Zacharia and Maes present two reputation systems
(targeted at chatrooms, auctions, and newsletters): SPORAS and HISTOS. While these are not
strictly multi-agent systems, they present techniques to aggregate ratings intelligently and reﬂect the
real performance of human users in an online community. In both cases, the aggregation method
allows newer ratings to count more than older ones. SPORAS, however, gives new entrants low
initial reputation values and therefore reduces their chance of being selected as possible interaction
partners. This is a tradeoﬀ aﬀorded to prevent identity switching. This is because an agent having
low reputation would not be any better oﬀ by re-entering the system with a new identity. HISTOS
is an enhancement to SPORAS which takes into account the group dynamics as in REGRET. In
particular, HISTOS looks at the links between users to deduce personalised reputation values (i.e.
taking into account the social network). This enables an agent to assemble ratings from those it
trusts already rather than those it does not know. Moreover, both HISTOS and SPORAS have
been shown to be robust to collusion. This is because those agents that are badly rated themselves
have a diminished eﬀect on the reputation of others and those they might want to protect. However,
as the authors point out themselves, the major drawback is that users are reluctant to give bad
ratings to their trading partners. This is because there is no incentive to give ratings in the ﬁrst place
(i.e. it is not incentive compatible).
In an attempt to make their reputation mechanism incentive compatible, Jurca and Faltings
(2002, 2003) introduce side payments to make it rational for agents to share reputation information.
Thus agents can buy and sell reports to and from special information agents supplied by the system.
Reports are values between 0 and 1, where 0 represents completely bad behaviour and 1 represents
absolute trustworthy behaviour. Agents are only allowed to sell a report for an agent when they
have previously bought reputation information for that agent. This ensures that agents cannot sell
reputation information they make up by themselves. They additionally propose two conditions to
make a reputation mechanism robust to lying witnesses:
• agents that behave as good citizens (report truthfully) should not lose any utility;
• agents that give false reports should gradually lose utility.
In their model, they aim to fulﬁl the above conditions by implementing information agents which
pay only for reports (to one agent) if they match the next report given by another agent (having
interacted with the same agent as the previous one). In this way, the authors claim that agents
revealing truthfully get paid and those that do not will lose money in buying reports and not getting
paid when they sell them on. However, this method does not work if most agents lie about the
reports or if they collude in giving false reports. Moreover, they assume that information agents
already store some reputation information after bootstrapping the system. This overly simpliﬁes the
process of reputation management and additionally does not take into account the case of new
entrants into the system. More work is therefore needed to make this model applicable to open
multi-agent systems.
Jurca and Faltings’s reputation mechanism actually aims to be generic and, as a result, suﬀers the
above shortcomings. It might be preferable instead to design reputation mechanisms that are
tailored to individual protocols of interaction. In this respect, Dellarocas (2002) introduced
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This system:
• induces sellers of variable quality goods to truthfully reveal the quality of their goods;
• provides incentives to buyers to truthfully reveal their feedback.
The GWH algorithm uses the threat of biased future reporting of quality (of goods to be sold)
in order to induce sellers to truthfully declare the individual qualities of their items. Speciﬁcally, the
mechanism keeps track of the seller’s ‘‘goodwill’’. This value represents the seller’s trustworthiness.
It is adjusted by the quality reported by buyers. Good reports bias goodwill positively and bad
reports bias it negatively. To induce sellers to reveal the true quality of their goods, the goodwill
factor is used to adjust the quality they wish to broadcast for the goods they wish to sell. Thus if
the seller has low goodwill, the quality of the goods it tries to publicise will be actually shown to
have a lower quality by the system.
To induce buyers to report their ratings of sellers, they are given rebates on future transactions
in the system. It is then shown that, if buyers report untruthfully, they can drive out sellers of good
quality goods, and therefore lose the opportunity of buying high-quality goods. However, the
mechanism makes several somewhat unrealistic assumptions about online markets. For example, it
assumes that sellers are monopolists; that is, they are the only ones to sell a particular product (of
varying quality). Also it assumes that buyers will interact with sellers only once. These assumptions
are needed to simplify the analysis of the model. As the author points out, among other
enhancements, it is still to be shown how the mechanism fares against strategic reporting from
buyers whereby they force a seller to reduce the price of their goods by giving them bad ratings,
hence damaging their reputation.
The reputation mechanisms detailed above and the interaction mechanisms discussed in Section
3.1 try to enforce trustworthy behaviour by minimising the opportunity for agents to defect to gain
higher payoﬀs (see our deﬁnition of trust in Section 1). As has been shown, more of these
mechanisms still need to be developed. In the case where interaction protocols and reputation
mechanisms cannot guarantee trustworthy behaviour, there still exists a need to give agents in an
open system the possibility of proving their trustworthiness so as to enable other agents to recognise
them as reliable interaction partners. One way this could proceed is by providing references from
highly-recognised sources. This is similar to the case of a job seeker providing its credentials to its
potential new employer. Note that this process is not the same as reputation building and
acquisition which pertains to the recognition of an entire community. Rather, credential assessment
falls within the realm of network security which we discuss next.
3.3 Security mechanisms
In the domain of network security11, trust is used to describe the fact that a user can prove who they
say they are (Mass & Shehory, 2001). This normally entails that they can be authenticated by
trusted third parties (i.e. those that can be relied upon to be trustworthy and as such are authorities
in the system (Grandison & Sloman, 2000). At a ﬁrst glance, this does not completely ﬁt with our
initial deﬁnition of trust (see Section 1), but it is certainly a basic requirement for the trust models
and mechanisms described earlier to work (see Sections 2.1–2.3, 3.1, 3.2). This is because these
models are based on the fact that agents can be recognised by their identity and would therefore
require authentication protocols to be implemented.
To this end, Poslad et al. (2002) have recently proposed a number of security requirements
that they claim are essential for agents to trust each other and each other’s messages transmitted
11 We do not wish to give a complete account of network security mechanisms since this is beyond the scope
of this paper. Rather, we will focus on the main concepts and models that strictly pertain to multi-agent
systems. For a wider reading on network security for open distributed systems see Grandison and Sloman
(2000) .
Trust in multi-agent systems 17across the network linking them (i.e. to ensure messages are not tampered with by malicious agents).
• Identity: the ability to determine the identity of an entity. This may include the ability to
determine the identity of the owner of an agent.
• Access permissions: the ability to determine what access rights must be given to an agent in the
system, based on the identity of the agent.
• Content integrity: the ability to determine whether a piece of software, a message, or other data
has been modiﬁed since it has been dispatched by its originating source.
• Content privacy: the ability to ensure that only the designated identities can examine a message
or other data. To the others, the information is obscured.
The authors specify these requirements for the FIPA (Foundation for Intelligent Physical
Agents) abstract architecture (FIPA, 2002). These basic requirements can be implemented by a
public key encryption and certiﬁcate infrastructure (Grandison & Sloman, 2000). A digital
certiﬁcate is issued by a certiﬁcation authority (CA) and veriﬁes that a public key is owned by a
particular entity. The public key in a certiﬁcate is also used to encrypt and sign a message in a way
that only its owner can examine the content and be assured about its integrity. The two most
popular public key models are PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) and the X.509 trust model (Adam &
Farrel, 1999). The former supports a web of trust in that there is no centralised or hierarchical
relationship between CAs, while the latter is a strictly hierarchical trust model for authentication
(Grandison & Sloman, 2000). However, these authenticating measures do not suﬃce for open
multi-agent systems to ensure that agents act and interact honestly and reliably towards each other.
They only represent a barrier against agents that are not allowed in the system or only permit their
identiﬁcation in the system. In order to enforce good behaviour in the system, it is instead possible
that certiﬁcates are issued to agents if these meet speciﬁc standards that make them trustworthy.
In order to achieve this, trusted third parties are needed to issue certiﬁcates to agents that satisfy
the standards of trustworthiness (i.e. being reciprocative, reliable, honest). For example, agents
would need to satisfy certain quality standards (e.g. products stamped with the Kitemark or the
‘‘CE’’ marking are assured to conform to the British standards and the European community
standards respectively) and terms and conditions for the products they sell (e.g. sellers have to abide
by a 14-day full-refund return policy in the UK for any goods they sell). It is only upon compliance
with these quality standards that the agent would be able to sell its products. To this end, Herzberg
et al. (2000) present a policy-based and certiﬁcate-based mechanism which can assign roles to new
entrants. A certiﬁcate in this work is signed by some issuer and contains some claims about a
subject. There is no restriction on what claims can be. For example, there may be claims about
organisation memberships (company employee, etc.), capabilities of the subject, or even the
trustworthiness (or reliability) of the subject in the view of the issuer.
The mechanism in Herzberg et al. (2000) also enables a party to deﬁne policies for mapping new
entrants to predeﬁned business roles. Thus an agent can ensure that a new entrant will act according
to the settings deﬁned by their role or access rights. The role assigned to an agent carries with it a
number of duties and policies they need to abide by. If the agent undertakes the role, they are forced
to abide by the given rules of good behaviour. The process of role assignment and access provision
is performed in a fully distributed manner, where any party or agent may be a certiﬁcate issuer.
Moreover, it is not required that certiﬁcate issuers be known in advance. Instead, it is suﬃcient that,
when requested, an agent that issues certiﬁcates provides suﬃcient certiﬁcates from other issuers to
be considered a trusted authority according to the policy of the requesting party. This allows
distributed trust to build up among parties in an open environment (Mass & Shehory, 2001).
Mass and Shehory extend the work in Herzberg et al. (2000) to open multi-agent systems (Mass
& Shehory, 2001). Speciﬁcally, they take into account the fact that agents with reasoning or
planning components can adapt their strategies rather than sticking to one strategy while
maintaining their role (as discussed in Section 2.1). This means that an agent’s role does not fully
constrain their actions so as to prevent them from reasoning strategically about their interactions
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have. For example, an agent baring the role of accountant in a system could report ﬁctitious proﬁts,
thus beneﬁting their company’s share price, while still satisfying their role. To prevent such strategic
defection or wrong doing, the agent assigning the role to the new entrant is allowed to adjust their
priorities or policy based on results from interactions with others dynamically. This presents a more
realistic view of using trust (both at the individual and system level) to decide how to constrain the
actions (or strategies) of an interaction partner.
4 Discussion and conclusion
This paper has systematically analysed the issue of trust in open multi-agent systems. We have
deliberately taken a broad-based approach in order to produce a comprehensive view of this
multi-faceted topic. In particular, we have related the diﬀerent means of devising trust ﬁrstly at the
individual level and then at the system level. These two approaches lay the burden of computation
on the agent and the system respectively. In eﬀect, they complement each other by minimising risks
in diﬀerent circumstances diﬀerently and aim to solve the same problem of deciding the ‘‘who,
when, and how’’ of interactions.
At the individual level, we have described learning and evolutionary models that show how
agents could evolve or learn more reciprocative strategies in order to get higher payoﬀs in the long
run. Various means of characterising the experience from individual interactions were presented
and these were shown to lead to a measure of trust that enables an agent to choose future
interaction partners and shape these interactions based on their personal experience with them. In
contrast, reputation models have been shown to be eﬃcient at gathering the experiences of others
in various ways and using these to deduce the level of trustworthiness of another party. Various
ways of gathering ratings from other parties using a social network were discussed. In so doing, we
have illustrated how the problem of lying witnesses can be dealt with using learning and
probabilistic techniques and how agents can deal with the lack of ratings from the network. Having
described the various ways of gathering information about direct and indirect experiences, it was
then shown how an agent could use this information to form various beliefs about its counterparts.
The socio-cognitive approach to trust also takes into account the fact that other beliefs about an
agent’s capabilities and motivations are essential in judging their trustworthiness.
Trust being enforced by the system was ﬁrst discussed at the level of the interaction protocols
and mechanisms themselves. We showed how the system can be devised so as to force the agents
to be trustworthy. We particularly illustrated how auctions could be made secure and foster truth
revelation on the part of bidders. We then showed how the threat of future punishment (through
avoidance of or constraining interaction(s)) could be used by reputation mechanisms to prevent
agents from lying about their preferences or forcing them to behave well in an open environment.
Various methods of aggregating ratings and incentivising agents to return ratings were discussed.
The use of reputation through certiﬁcates was also shown to be an important solution in security
mechanisms. The latter also ensure that agents are properly authenticated and therefore present a
ﬁrst line of defence against malicious agents in open multi-agent systems.
As can be seen from Figure 1, while the individual-level trust models enable an agent to reason
about their level of trust in their opponents, the system-level mechanisms aim to ensure that these
opponents’ actions can actually be trusted. In more detail, using their trust models, agents can:
• reason about strategies to be used towards trustworthy and untrustworthy interaction partners
(e.g. being reciprocative or selﬁsh towards them) given a calculation of payoﬀs over future
interactions;
• reason about the information gathered through various means (e.g. either directly or through
reputation models) about potential interaction partners;
• reason about the motivations and capabilities of these interaction partners to decide whether to
believe in their trustworthiness.
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agents to act and interact truthfully by:
• imposing conditions that would cause them to lose utility if they did not abide by them;
• using their reputation to promote their future interactions with other agents in the community or
demote future interactions whenever they do not behave well;
• imposing speciﬁed standards of good conduct that they need to satisfy and maintain in order to
be allowed in the system.
In the remaining sections, we provide a motivating scenario that shows how these abstract trust
concepts can be grounded in a particular application context and then outline future work that
would be needed to completely deﬁne comprehensive trust models and mechanisms.
4.1 Trust in practice
We choose the semantic Web to illustrate the practical applications of trust for open multi-agent
systems. This is because, while potential applications of agent-based systems such as ubiquitous
computing and pervasive computing applications are still in their infancy, the semantic Web is
building upon the considerable success of the World Wide Web and technologies associated with
it. Moreover, the semantic Web is strongly motivated by concepts in multi-agent systems (e.g.
reasoning under uncertainty, ontologies, communication languages). It can therefore be considered
that the semantic Web will provide the testbed for the ﬁrst large-scale application of agent-based
systems in everyday life. For these reasons, we provide the following vision of the semantic Web
(adapted from Berners-Lee et al. (2001)) and detail the roles of trust models and interaction
mechanisms within it.
Figure 1 A classiﬁcation of approaches to trust in multi-agent systems
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a series of physical therapy sessions.( We identify the need for trust at each step of the scenario in
italics.)
At the doctor’s o$ce, Lucy instructed her Semantic Web agent through
her handheld Web browser. The agent promptly retrieved information about
Mom’s prescribed treatment from the doctor’s agent, looked up several
lists of providers, and checked for the ones in-plan for Mom’s insurance
within a 20-mile radius of her home and with a rating of excellent or very
good on trusted rating services.
The ﬁrst interaction between Lucy’s agent and the doctor’s agent should involve a secure
authentication protocol (see Section 3.3) that would ensure that Lucy’s agent is allowed to handle her
mom’s data. This protocol would ﬁrst verify the true identity of Lucy’s agent and assign to it the proper
rights to handle the data. Also, the trusted rating services could be based on reputation mechanisms
(see Section 3.2). These reputation mechanisms could publish the ratings of health-care providers and
reward agents which return ratings with discounts on treatment costs to be paid to the advertised
providers. This would make the mechanism incentive-compatible. Also, diﬀerent providers could bid,
via a trusted mechanism such as a secure Vickrey auction, to provide the requested service to Lucy’s
agent (see Section 3.1). Provider agents would need to bid their true valuation of the treatment plan
requested to win the bid whereas Lucy’s agent would act as the auctioneer in this case.
Lucy’s agent then began trying to ﬁnd a match between available
appointment times (supplied by the agents of individual providers through
their Web sites) and Pete’s and Lucy’s busy schedules. In a few minutes
the agent presented them with a plan. Pete didn’t like it: University
Hospital was all the way across town from Mom’s place, and he would be
driving back in the middle of rush hour. He set his own agent to redo the
search with stricter preferences about location and time. Lucy’s agent,
having complete trust in Pete’s agent in the context of the present task,
automatically assisted by supplying access certiﬁcates and shortcuts to
the data it had already sorted through.
The interaction between individual providers and the user agents (Lucy’s and Pete’s) needs a secure
mechanism that ensures messages transmitted between all parties are not manipulated. Pete’s agent
could enhance the search for trustworthy potential providers by looking at its past interaction history
with them (see Section 2.1) rather than looking at only the reputed ones (see Sections 2.2 and 2.3).
It could also use referrals of other agents in the network to get in touch with a trustworthy agent it does
not directly know.
Almost instantly the new plan was presented: a much closer clinic and
earlier times – but there were two warning notes. First, Pete would have
to reschedule a couple of his less important appointments. He checked
that they were not a problem. The other was something about the insurance
company’s list failing to include this provider under physical
therapists: ‘‘Service type and insurance plan status securely veriﬁed by
other means,’’ the agent reassured him. ‘‘(Details?)’’.
Here the issue of reputation and distributed security is again raised (Sections 2.2 and 3.3). The
‘‘other means’’ that have helped to check the validity of the insurance company may pertain to an
analysis of the certiﬁcates it provided that linked it to trusted sources. These certiﬁcates could provide
evidence of the provider’s compliance with laws and regulations of the country or certain quality
standards that are equivalent to those needed by the insurance company.
Lucy registered her assent at about the same moment Pete was muttering,
‘‘Spare me the details,’’ and it was all set. (Of course, Pete couldn’t
resist the details and later that night had his agent explain how it had
found that provider even though it was not on the proper list.)
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acquired in the environment about potential interaction partners is highlighted (see Section 2.3). This
implies a higher level reasoning ability than just an evaluation of the reputation of providers, for
example. The agent should also be able to reason about the selected provider’s location and treatment
facilities to decide on whether to trust that provider in being able to supply the required services.
4.2 Open issues
We end our analysis of the state of the art in trust in multi-agent systems by outlining the key issues
that need to be solved in order to have a comprehensive trust model for open multi-agent systems.
Strategic lying: while some reputation mechanisms and models try to deal with this problem (such
as Schillo et al. (2000); Sen & Sajja (2002); Zacharia & Maes (2000)), most models do not give a
deep treatment of strategic lying. Strategic lies aim to trick agents into believing the liars are
trustworthy while allowing the liars to exploit these unaware agents. A more thorough treatment
is needed to address this shortcoming both at the individual level and at the system level of trust.
Collusion detection: very few existing reputation or interaction mechanisms can prevent or deal with
collusion (Brandt, 2002; Sen & Sajja, 2002). Moreover, while it has been shown how agents can
learn to reciprocate good actions over time, it has not been shown how they could learn to collude,
which is equivalent to reciprocating to only some agents and sharing false information about these
accomplices to exploit others. We could expect agents to collude in an open environment, and if the
system is to be robust and incentive compatible, collusion should be prevented. Otherwise, agents
could end up wrongly trusting others that are, in fact, exploiting them.
Context: most trust models do not take into account the fact that interactions take place within a
particular organisational and environmental context (with the exception of the socio-cognitive
approach to some extent). If an agent has performed poorly due to changes in their environment,
they should not be taken to be dishonest or a liar. Rather, there should be the possibility to take
into account the environmental variables in deciding to trust another agent. This necessitates a
better evaluation of risks present in the environment (Yamagishi et al., 1998; Molm et al., 2000). If
risks are high due to the lack of stringent rules of encounter (e.g. preventing lying), an agent
interacting honestly would then be considered to be more trustworthy than if the protocol of
interaction dictated truth-telling, for example. Thus, if rules prevent lying, there is no need to
increase trust in interaction partners if they interact well since there is no guarantee they would still
do so if the rules were not present (Molm et al., 2000).
Expectations: none of the models surveyed showed how agents could convey their expectations
(about the outcome of interactions) to each other (e.g. about the quality of goods exchanged or time
of delivery). This we believe is important because, in an open environments, agents can have
diﬀerent concepts or ontologies that describe the expectations from an interaction. For example,
‘‘high-quality service’’ could mean ‘‘timely delivery of goods’’ for one agent while the other party
implied ‘‘good price’’ in the former’s ontology. REGRET presents such an ontological dimension
of trust ratings that are shared but does not show how this dimension could be shared between
interaction partners to better understand each other’s expectations about the outcomes of the
interaction. Understanding these expectations would enable an agent to satisfy them in the way that
they are understood to be from the other side. Otherwise an agent could be deemed untrustworthy
because of its ignorance of the real expectations of another party.
Social networks: while in most reputation models or security mechanisms (to some extent) it is
assumed that there exists a social network, the connections between the nodes in the network are
rarely, if at all, given a meaning (i.e. the semantics of connections are not detailed). Connections
have mostly been used to represent past interactions among the agents in the community (i.e. a
connection means that an interaction has occurred between the two nodes at its ends) or are simply
22 . .   .given to the agents (Schillo et al., 2000; Sabater & Sierra, 2002; Yu & Singh, 2002b). A clearer
deﬁnition of relationships (e.g. as collaborators, partnerships in coalitions, or members of the same
organisations) deﬁning the connections within the network would be needed. This, we foresee,
should enable a better aggregation and evaluation of ratings, and hence trust.
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